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1. The subject of this paper is what has been called "the widely held thesis that argument validity is at bottom a
matter of form."1 I am interested in a version of that thesis in which ‘validity’ bears the broad sense that Trudy
Govier has called "umbrella validity":
An argument is valid if its premises are properly connected to its conclusion and provide adequate
reasons for it. It is invalid otherwise.2  
and which she contrasts both with deductive validity and with formal validity.3
Preliminaries
2. In what follows, I am going to operate on the supposition that arguments are invitations to inference and that
logical appraisal of an argument (as opposed, say, to rhetorical appraisal or moral appraisal) focuses on
whether it is reasonable for those to whom the argument is addressed to make the inference that the argument
invites.4
When we learn to engage in argumentation, and when we learn to make all but the most rudimentary
inferences, we are initiated into an intersubjective practice of criticism that enables us to appraise inferences
on the basis of certain broadly or commonly recognized features and/or standards. I have argued elsewhere
that this practice of criticism in its developed form cannot be reduced to the application of any simple or
straightforward sets of rules.5 The case I attempt to make here will not presuppose this latter point, but is
intended rather to supplement it by considering what role it is reasonable to expect logical form to play in the
practice of criticism or critical reflection.
I take it to be uncontroversial that the aims of our critical practice are advanced by formulating, as best we can,
the premisses and conclusion of any argument/inference we wish to appraise, and then asking (a) whether its
premisses are acceptable and (b) whether its premisses are suitably linked to its conclusion.6 The word ‘valid’
is often pressed into service (as in Govier’s definition of ‘umbrella’ validity quoted above) to render a positive
verdict about the link between premisses and conclusion.7
It is a common view that formal deductive logic (FDL) provides a theory of validity that can supply a theoretical
basis for our assessments of premiss-conclusion link. That common view easily leads to the idea that validity
in the broad sense is a matter of logical form, since for FDL to have a bearing of actual arguments and
inferences, those arguments (or the statements which comprise them) must be seen as exemplifying the forms
which FDL studies.
But this common view is suspect. John Woods, in a paper entitled "The Necessity of Formalism in Informal
Logic," has conceded that formal deductive logic does not, as such, constitute a theory of inference; it supplies
only a theory of entailment.8 And I have argued elsewhere that entailment is neither a necessary not sufficient
condition for premisses to be suitably linked to a conclusion.9
The focus of the present paper is not the issue of whether all good arguments are deductively valid, or whether
deductivism – the view all arguments should be understood as attempts at deductive (i.e., deductively valid)
arguments)10 – is correct. The focus of the present paper is the issue of whether logical form holds the key to
validity It is worth noting that at least one recent defender of deductivism insists that deductive validity is a
broader concept than formal validity and stresses that it is "the broader conception of validity which is the heart
of the deductivism…."11
In the present paper, I shall simply try to develop two sets of counterexamples to the idea argument validity is at
In the present paper, I shall simply try to develop two sets of counterexamples to the idea argument validity is at
bottom a matter of (logical) form. The set  proposed as counterexamples consists of arguments or inferences
that depend on semantic entailments. The second set consists of inductive generalizations considered in the
light of Goodman’s paradox.
3. Before turning to the counterexamples, let me point out that our critical practice contains techniques for
appraising premiss-conclusion links which do not appear to depend on the identification of logical form.
In "Logical Analogies," Trudy Govier wrote:
The technique of refuting arguments by constructing logically parallel ones seems to me to be
interesting in a number of ways….Like formal approaches, the technique is based on a perception
that the argument refuted has a structure which is general. If the structure is shown to be flawed,
then the original argument is refuted. Like nonformal approaches, refutation by logical analogy
does not require symbolization of the argument. Nor does it involve appeals to explicit rules of
inference.12
Govier notes that this technique "seems to be applicable to nondeductive arguments as well as to deductive
ones" (p. 27), and two of her examples are of arguments that would not normally be classed as deductive
arguments.13
Govier illustrates the technique with two examples of its use drawn from actual writings and with a couple of
made-up examples. This is how she describes what happens in these examples:
Refutations by logical analogy is based on duplicating the ‘core’ of an argument in another
argument by varying non-essential aspects while preserving essential ones. The parallel argument
is exhibited to be, or argued to be flawed. Seeing that it is flawed, we are to see the original as
flawed also.14
Maurice Finococchiaro, in papers devoted to blunting Gerald Massey’s thesis that there can be "no method
whatsoever of establishing invalidity that has theoretical legitimacy",15 appeals to refutation by logical analogy
as a method of establishing invalidity which is a "way of bypassing the problem of having to deal with a logical
form to attribute to the arguments in question and to be instantiated by them."16 Though Finocchiaro does
speak of the argument and its analogue as sharing the same logical form, he writes:
However, this is still too formalist. I believe that ultimately we should take more seriously the
suggestion implicit in the label which refers to analogy. That is, ultimately this method of
invalidation should be conceived as analogical reasoning about arguments, that I, as meta-
argument which concludes that the given argument is invalid because the counterexample
argument is invalid and the two arguments are analogous. Then the alleged analogy could be
discussed in the usual ways, be examining the extent and nature of the similarities and the
dissimilarities between the two arguments.17
A point that neither Govier nor Finocchiaro explicitly acknowledges, but which seems to me to be both true and
important, is that logical analogy can be used to validate as well as to invalidate an argument or inference.
Thus if you challenge an inference I make, insisting that its premisses don’t genuinely support its conclusion,
my rejoinder can consist in pointing to a similar argument that you yourself have used or that you are prepared
to concede is a good one, and insist that it is strictly analogous to the argument or inference you object to. Our
disagreement will then take the form of examining the extent and nature of the similarities and the
dissimilarities between the two arguments, and may be resolved by such an examination.
I will return at a later point to the question of whether evaluative techniques based on logical analogy turn, in the
final analysis, on considerations of logical form (or of argument form in some interesting, if broader, sense).
4. One final preliminary remark, on the term ‘logical form.’ Jaakko Hintikka, writing on the nature of logic in the
4. One final preliminary remark, on the term ‘logical form.’ Jaakko Hintikka, writing on the nature of logic in the
Encyclopedia Britannica, says:
[The] narrower sense of logic is related to the influential idea of logical form. In any given sentence,
all of the nonlogical terms may be replaced by variables of the appropriate type, keeping only the
logical constants intact. The result is a formula exhibiting the logical form of the sentence. If the
formula results in a true sentence for any substitution of interpreted terms (of the appropriate
logical type) for the variables, the formula and the sentence are said to be logically true (in the
narrower sense of the expression).18
The logical form of a sentence just is what is represented by the type of formula that Hintikka describes in the
passage above.19 The logical form of an argument or inference will be a function of the logical forms of the
statements that constitute its premisses and conclusion.
Notice that the definition of a logical truth in the passage from Hintikka echoes Quine’s in "Two Dogmas of
Empiricism":
…a logical truth is a statement which is true and remains true under all reinterpretations of its
components other than the logical particles.20
Notice also that what is to count as logical form (and as logical truth) will depend on which expressions we
include on our list of logical constants or logical particles. If modal operators and/or set-theoretic expressions
are counted as "logic constants," the extension of logical form will be considerably broader than it will be if we
restrict the list of "logical particles" to the sentential connectives of standard propositional calculus together
with the quantifiers and bound variables of first-order predicate calculus (perhaps throwing in the identity
operator for good measure). There is, therefore, a certain elasticity in the notion of logical form, but that
elasticity need not deter us in what follows.
Semantic entailments
5. One set of arguments or inferences that appear to be valid without being formally valid consist of those that
depend on semantic entailments. Here is an example:
(A1) The person standing next to the prime minister is his sister. 
(A2) Therefore, the person standing next to the prime minister is female.
On the surface, at least, A1 entails A2 and under appropriate circumstances21 can provide good reason for
believing A2. Let me consider two objections to the claim that arguments that depend on semantic entailments
are examples of arguments whose validity does not depend on logical form.
6. The first objection is that the inference from A1 to A2 is legitimated by the proposition, principle or
"meaning postulate" that
Anybody who is somebody’s sister is female
which can be rendered in "canoncial notation" as
(AMP) (x) if there is a y such that x is sister to y, then x is female.
According to this objection, the premiss set from which we conclude A2 includes both A1 and the additional
premiss AMP. But then the inference or argument in question in fact exemplifies a valid logical form, namely
(FA1) Rba (b stands is relation R [e.g., being a sister of] to a)
(FAMP) (x) if there is a y such that Rxy, then Fx
(FA2) Therefore, Fb
Now it is clearly possible to "convert" or "reconstruct" any inference or argument into one that exemplifies a
Now it is clearly possible to "convert" or "reconstruct" any inference or argument into one that exemplifies a
valid logical form by adding a suitably crafted additional premiss.22 The issue is whether we ought to do so in
this case, and in particular whether it serves the aims of critical practice to so construe examples like this one.
My current view is that there are no conclusive arguments pro or con on this issue.23 Permit me, however, to
cite an argument which I believe creates a presumption in favor of not viewing inferences that depend on
semantic entailments as enthymemes (and, in particular, as inferences which exhibit a valid logical form when
their "suppressed premisses" are made explicit). The argument has four assumptions:
(a)  in simple cases like the one in our example, so long as the inference does not beg the
question the issue of whether premiss A1 is suitably linked to the conclusion A2 reduces to the
issue of whether A1 entails A2
(b)  the relevant concept of entailment is the concept of strict implication; that is to say, p entails q if
and only if it is impossible that p and not-q;
(c)  it is a truth of modal logic that if (p and q) strictly entail r and it is a necessary truth that p, then q
strictly entails r;24
(d)  the "meaning postulates" which we would add as premisses qualify as necessary truths.
From these assumptions (b)-(d) it follows that wherever A1 & AMP entail A2, and AMP is a meaning postulate,
then A1 by itself entails A2. In other words, semantic entailments hold without the inclusion of meaning
postulates as additional premisses. From this and (a) it follows that inferences which hinge on semantic
entailments are not dependent on the logical form that is exemplified when a meaning postulate is brought into
the picture.
What is debatable in the argument just stated is its assumption that "meaning postulates" qualify as necessary
truths. When Carnap first introduced the notion of meaning postulates (as a way of understanding analyticity in
the face of Quine’s criticisms of that notion), he dealt with them only in relation to artificial languages and that
they were "not a matter of knowledge but of decision" - though he does picture the decision to be made as a
decision about whether one property is to entail another.25
Carnap’s view notwithstanding, I would submit that the "meaning postulate" AMP does function as a "truth" in
the proposed reconstruction, and that it cannot be construed as simple universal generalization drawn from
first order predicate calculus. Simple universal generalizations do not sustain counterfactual conditionals, but
AMP surely does. That is to say, in light of AMP we can conclude
If Bill Clinton had been somebody’s sister, then Bill Clinton would have been female.
Whatever we make of AMP, the conditional embedded in it can’t be a material condition, and is most naturally
construed as strict implication. But then, in light of the definition of strict implication, AMP itself will count as a
necessary truth, from which it will follow that A1 by itself entails A2.
7. The second objection concedes that validity in general cannot be reduced to logical validity – does not turn
on logical form - but insists validity should be understood in terms of argument forms that don’t necessarily
reduce to logical form.
David Hitchcock, in an interesting series of papers, has articulated a notion of argument validity designed to
avoid interpreting arguments like the one in our example as enthymematic.26 Roughly, he says that in any
argument we can regard some components fixed and others as variable. If I understand him, the variable
components are the ones such that "intercategorial" replacement of them results in an analogue which is a
potential counterexample to the original argument. An analogue is an actual counterexample if any only if its
premisses are true and its conclusion false. An argument is conclusively27 valid if and only if it has no
analogue that is a counterexample.28
analogue that is a counterexample.28
On the basis of the forgoing notion of validity, Hitchcock(1994) says we can develop an alternative conception
"which we might call formal or schematic". In this alternative conception, the "form or schema produced by
replacing the variable components with distinct variables has no instances with true premisses and a false
conclusion" (p. 59). He adds,
…this condition in turn is met if the universal generalization over those variables of the argument’s
associated material conditional…is true.29
Using the example above, the form or schema would be
(SA1) The person standing next to the X is X’s sister. 
(SA2) Therefore, the person standing next to X is female.
And the universal generalization would be
(UA) (X) if the person standing next to X is X’s sister, then the person standing next to X is female
Hitchcock observes
Validity as thus defined is a broad concept, covering not only logical validity but also semantic
validity and what we might call factual validity. We might distinguish these kinds on the basis that
the covering generalization of a logically valid argument is a logical truth, containing only logical
expressions and variables; the covering generalization of a semantically valid argument is a logical
consequence of semantic postulates; and the covering generalization of a factually valid argument
is a factual truth, true in virtue of the way the world is.30
Presumably, UA would not be counted a premiss of the argument, but rather a covering generalization in virtue
of whose truth the original argument is conclusively valid. And presumably UA would be construed as a logical
consequence of semantic postulates, thus rendering that argument semantically but not logically valid.
However, Hitchcock himself appears not to take the distinction between these three "species" of conclusive
validity terribly seriously, since he says (pp. 59-60):
…the distinction between logical truths, semantic postulates and factual truths is notoriously
arbitrary and not much is gained by making it.
Nevertheless, on Hitchcock’s reading arguments that trade on semantic entailments would owe their validity to
the argument form represented (in our example) in SA1 and SA2.
How serious an objection does this reading constitute to the claim that semantic entailments provide
counterexamples to the idea that "argument validity is at bottom a matter of form"?
1)  Hitchcock’s reading constitutes no problem whatsoever for the claim that semantic entailments
are counterexamples to the idea that all good arguments owe their validity to logical form.
2)  If Hitchcock’s reading is accepted without qualification, it would follow that "semantic validity" is
a consequence of form in some interesting, but broader sense of form.
I consider it an open question whether Hitchcock’s reading should be accepted without qualification, for the
following reason. As presented in the 1995 paper (if I have interpreted that paper correctly), generating the
schemata requisite for the "formal or schematic" notion of validity depends on interpreting some argument
components as fixed and some as variable.31 As far as I can see, however, whether a component should be
interpreted as variable depends on whether the result of substituting for it produces a genuine analogue of the
argument from which we started.32 That is to say, the notion of form feeds off the notion of variable
component, which in turn feeds off the notion of a logical analogue. But if that is so, then the criticism and
evaluation of arguments in terms of logical analogy would have to be more fundamental than the identification
evaluation of arguments in terms of logical analogy would have to be more fundamental than the identification
of validity in terms of argument form. And that result, if true, would undermine the idea that validity is, at base, a
matter of form. But the waters are murky here, and I won’t go any further than to say that it remains an open
question whether Hitchcock’s reading demonstrates that "semantic validity" should be understood in terms of
argument form.
Inductive inferences and Goodman’s paradox
8. Given that there is no generally recognized formal logic of nondeductive inference, but that we are able to
reach rationally motivated intersubjective agreement in our appraisals of particular nondeductive inferences,
we might be tempted to conclude straight away that appraising premiss-conclusion links in such cases doesn’t
depend on considerations of logical form. It would, however, be a mistake to leap too quickly to that
conclusion, because for at least some cases of nondeductive inference – the cases most naturally called
inductive - we certainly seem able to identify patterns or forms that, at the very least, qualify such inferences as
candidates for the status of "inductively valid" inference. To put the matter another way, from the fact that we
lack a formal theory of nondeductive inference we can’t conclude that our pre-theoretic judgments about such
inferences don’t depend on formal considerations.
9. I want to argue, however, that reflection on Goodman’s new riddle of induction – often called the grue/bleen
paradox – ought to raise serious doubts about whether the assessment of premiss/conclusion link in inductive
inferences depends on purely formal considerations.
Goodman frames the riddle in terms of its bearing on the theory of ‘confirmation.’ A generalization of the form
‘(x) if Fx then Gx’ is supposed to be confirmed by finding "positive instances" – objects that are both F and G
(and disconfirmed by finding objects that are F and not G). An example would be
(1) All emeralds are green
But not all generalizations are confirmed by positive instances. Let ‘grue’ be a predicate that is true of an
object iff that object is green and examined before time t or else is blue. Goodman claims that the hypothesis
(2) All emeralds are grue
is not confirmed by finding positive instances – i.e., emeralds which are grue. Thus let t be some time in the
near future. Then any examined emerald which is green is also grue (since it will be green and examined
before t). And if to date we have found only green emeralds, then (2) will be confirmed by positive instances to
the same degree that (1) is. But if we take both (1) and (2) to be established, we will have to conclude that any
emeralds found after time t will be both green and blue, an unacceptable consequence.33
Goodman takes it to be obvious that (1) is confirmed by its positive instances, but that (2) is not. He says that
confirmation by positive instances must be restricted to generalizations or hypotheses that are "lawlike" as
opposed to "accidental" (Goodman 1965, p. 73), or to hypotheses that are "projectible" (see pp. 81-83 and all
of Chapter III).34 Goodman claims that until we have a theoretically adequate way of distinguishing hypotheses
that are projectible from those that are not, we do not have a theory of confirmation. Goodman’s treatment of
the problem, and most treatments that have followed in its wake, try to account for the fact that (1) is projectible
while (2) is not on the grounds that ‘green’ is a "well-behaved" predicate and grue is ‘ill-behaved’.35 Solving
the problem tends to be seen as requiring us to find a way of picking out the predicates (or sometimes the
properties) that are well-behaved (or that are projectible36) from those that are not.
10. It is worth noting that in developing the riddle or problem, Goodman considers and rejects the suggestion
that failure of positive instances to confirm "accidental hypotheses" can be explained by the fact that other,
additional evidence enters the picture to counteract or cancel the confirmation provided by positive confirming
instances (and to shore up the confirmation of the hypotheses that he considers lawlike).37 Without tracing the
detail of Goodman’s argumentation on this point, let me simply indicate its gist. Additional evidence will be
relevant to the hypothesis in question precisely insofar as it confirms further hypotheses that are relevant to the
relevant to the hypothesis in question precisely insofar as it confirms further hypotheses that are relevant to the
hypothesis in question (e.g., the hypothesis that the pattern of colors in various species of gems tends to be
stable over time – where by colors we mean hues from our standard list of hues). But such hypotheses will
have been confirmed only if they are lawlike rather than accidental, and hence "[w]e are faced anew with the
very problem we are trying to solve: the problem of distinguishing between lawlike and accidental hypotheses"
(p. 77). Goodman can make this move because of the way he defines the problem – as a problem of
distinguishing between hypotheses that can be confirmed by positive instances from hypotheses that cannot.
11. I am not about to offer a "solution" to Goodman’s riddle. But I want to suggest that we look at the riddle in a
rather different light than Goodman does. In particular, I suggest that we consider the puzzle in abstraction from
Goodman’s quest to define ‘confirmation.’ When we do that, we will be able to see that the riddle has a moral
that bears on the issue of whether "inductive validity" is a matter of logical form.
I suggest, first of all, that the inference from "positive confirming instances" to a universalized hypothesis like
(1) is just a special case of projecting a relative frequency from a sample to a population – i.e. reaching a
conclusion about the relative frequency of a property in a population on the basis of its relative frequency in a
sample drawn from the population.
If we look at the matter this way, then we should be less tempted to assume that what creates the "problem"
are ill-behaved predicates. To illustrate this, let grue be defined as ‘green and found before the year 2000 or
else blue and found after the year 1999.’38 Consider a sample S1 consisting of emeralds examined by people
whose research I have consulted to date. And consider a population P1 consisting of emeralds found before
the year 2000. All the emeralds in the sample will presumably be both green and grue. And notice that if the
relative frequency of green in the sample can be projected onto the population P1, then so can the relative
frequency of grue – since the extension of green in the population P1must be identical with the extension of
grue in that population.
If a problem arises, it is when be try to project grue from such a sample onto a population P2 consisting of
emeralds generally. Why do we think there is a difference between projecting grue onto P1 and projecting it
onto P2? I submit that we balk at projecting grue onto P2 because
(a)  we know that the sample contains no emeralds found after the year 1999
(b)  we believe it is likely that emeralds will be found after 1999 – i.e. that P2 contains such
emeralds
(c)  we believe that whether emerald is green does not depend on the year in which it is found (and
in particular, that within the population of emeralds green is statistically independent39 of found
after 1999)
(d)  we believe – perhaps as a consequence of (c) - that whether an emerald is grue does depend
on the year in which it is found (and in particular, that within the population of emeralds grue is not
statistically independent of found after 1999)
In short, we balk because of particular beliefs about the composition of the population and about the effect on
the color of emeralds40 of the time at which they are found. (Notice, by way of contrast, that whether or not a
leaf or a piece of fruit is green does depend on when it is observed – in particular, on the time of year.)
Why do these beliefs cause us to balk at projecting grue? Because, I suggest, we accept a rule that says
something like this:
(R1) Do not project the relative frequency of a property A from a sample onto a population when there is a
property B such that
(1)  B is underrepresented in the sample and
(1)  B is underrepresented in the sample and
(2)  B is likely to affect whether a member of the population has the property A.
R1 captures part of what we’re getting at when we say – rather too vaguely - that we should project only from
samples that are "representative" of the populations from which they are drawn. We cannot expect the
composition of our samples to be like the composition of the population in every respect; but we should strive
for samples whose composition is like that of the population in respect of those features we think will affect the
property whose frequency we are trying to determine.
Accordingly, the moral I want to draw is this: the decision we make about the validity of a given inductive
generalization depends in part on our background assumptions about logically contingent matters of fact; ergo,
inductive validity cannot possibly be reduced to matters of logical form.
12. Notice that I haven’t said anything about why it is OK to project green; I have merely tried to explain why we
balk at projecting grue. Let me flesh out this account just a bit by saying more about (A) the background
assumptions that impinge on the validity of projecting grue and (B) background assumptions that may be
relevant to the validity of projecting green.
(A) The salient assumption standing in the way of projecting grue is:
(BA) Whether an emerald is grue is affected by whether it is found after the year 1999.
Notice first of all that we do not now have any "direct" empirical evidence to support the assumption; we are
not in a position (in May of 1999) to compare the "grueness" of emeralds found before the year 2000 with
those found later. But try for a moment to imagine what it would be like to reject this assumption. We would
have to suppose that when emeralds are found after 1999 they will be blue rather than green. Now that is
certainly not logically impossible; as far as I can see, it is not even ruled out by our current scientific
understanding of natural processes. But it is something we would have a difficult time explaining on our current
scientific understanding of nature. The most we can say, I think, is that the salient assumption "coheres with"
our current understanding of the world, and its rejection does not.41 I do not take a stand on whether such
coherence "justifies" the assumptions or beliefs on the basis of which we impugn the validity of projecting grue.
But I do not see how we could discriminate as we do between the projections that are permissible and those
which are not unless we permit ourselves to bring such assumptions to bear.42
(B) We might be tempted to say: projecting a relative frequency from a sample to a population is prima facie
or presumptively valid, subject to caveats about, say, the size and representativeness43 of the sample. The
prima facie validity of projecting grue is "defeated" because, given our current beliefs, such projection violates
R1. The prima facie or presumptive validity of projecting green is not defeated and therefore projecting green
is valid "all things considered." And then we might add: prima facie or presumptive validity does reduce to a
matter of logical form – or something very close to logical form. However, there at least two reasons why we
should resist this temptation.
(i) Presumptive validity is not validity, nor even a "species" of validity - any more than presumptive  
innocence is a species of innocence.44 Even if we say that any inference having the form of an
inductive generalization should be presumed valid unless and until it is shown to violate one or
more caveats, we would only be saying that having such a form is a nonconclusive (or "refutable)
reason for saying that an inference is valid. And that does mean that there is a kind of validity
(prima facie or presumptive validity) which reduces to a matter of mere form; it means only that the
form of the inference is one of the considerations that enters into our judgments of its validity.
(ii) Moreover, we probably ought not to concede that merely having the form of an inductive
generalization by itself creates even a presumption of validity. Recall Govier’s definition of
umbrella validity quoted earlier: "An argument is valid if its premises are properly connected to its
conclusion and provide adequate reasons for it." Should we be prepared to assume we have
adequate reasons for accepting the conclusion of an inductive generalization in the absence of
any information about the size, composition and origin of the sample? Does the knowledge merely
that someone has done a survey of Canadian parents in which 60% of the respondents say they
don’t spank their children create even a presumption that we have adequate reasons for believing
that approximately 60% of Canadian parents don’t spank their children (or are disposed to say that
they don’t)? If we are inclined to say lacking a knowledge of the methodology used in the survey we
lack adequate reason for accepting the conclusion, then we ought reject the idea that the mere
form of inductive generalization creates a presumption of validity.45
There are broader issues connected with the points made here that are complicated and cannot be dealt with
summarily. In a recent book entitled Argument Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning46, Doug Walton
presents a carefully developed case for the view that by virtue of their form or pattern certain classes
arguments establish their conclusions presumptively and therefore shift the burden of proof in the context of
dialogue. Walton’s general view deserves careful consideration and cannot be dismissed on the basis of the
rather simple arguments presented here. Nevertheless, I believe that those arguments cast serious doubt on
the idea that having the form of an inductive generalization is by itself a sufficient condition of presumptive or
prima facie validity.
13. There is an obvious line of objection to the moral I’m trying to draw out of Goodman’s riddle. One can
concede that background assumptions of the sort indicated are pertinent to assessing the validity of inductive
generalizations, but insist that those assumptions function as additional unstated premisses of projective
inferences, rather than as "second order" grounds on which we pronounce such inferences valid or not.
But this objection will not work for the case at hand. The salient background assumption BA that undermines
the validity of projecting grue is not an additional premiss in an argument for the conclusion "All emeralds are
grue." It is rather a consideration which undermines the argument for that conclusion.
There is another objection involving the idea of unstated premisses that cannot be dealt with quite so easily.
On this objection, background assumptions are not pertinent to assessing the validity of inductive
generalizations, but are pertinent to assessing their soundness. Thus it might be claimed that the projective
inference from ‘All sampled emeralds are grue’ to ‘All emeralds are grue’ requires the assumption or premiss
AR The sample is representative of the population with respect to all those properties that affect
whether an emerald is grue.
The background assumptions (BA and the assumption that emeralds will be found after 1999), together with
the fact that the sample contains no emeralds found after 1999, lead to the conclusion that the required
premiss AR is false and hence to the conclusion that the inference is unsound. Moreover, it can be urged, the
validity of these reasonings, both pro and con, can be understood in terms of their logical form.
The problem with this objection lies in the dilemma it creates. Insisting that an assumption like AR is required
of every inductive generalization will force us either to deny cogency to most such inferences, or else to
endorse the argument from ignorance. For an argument to be not merely sound47 but cogent48, its premisses
must be reasonable to believe. What can render premisses like AR reasonable to believe? We are seldom in
a position to give a complete list of the properties that affect the property Q we are interested in, and where we
do know or believe that a property H affects Q, we are typically not in a position to determine whether the
frequency of H in the sample approximates to the frequency of H in the population. Accordingly, in most cases
we appear to have two choices:
(i)  admit that accepting AR is not reasonable – from which it follows that the inference is not
cogent
(ii)  maintain that it is reasonable to accept AR so long as we don’t have reason to disbelieve it –
which amounts to endorsing the argument from ignorance.
which amounts to endorsing the argument from ignorance.
The effect of pragmatic considerations on the validity of inductive generalization
14. There are, I think, additional reasons for doubting that assessment of the "validity" of nondeductive
inferences depends exclusively on considerations of logical form. These additional reasons are not rooted in
the moral I draw from Goodman’s paradox, but they may illuminate aspects of the "problem" occasioned by
Goodman’s examples.
Whether a particular type of evidence is adequate to warrant a conclusion depends on
(a)  the stakes involved in accepting or rejecting a conclusion
(b)  whether there are, in the context at hand, better means on which to base our attitude toward a
conclusion.
I do not have time to develop these reasons here, but permit me to offer a few brief examples that illustrate
them.
(a) When purchasing a gem – e.g., a diamond ring – typical purchasers are prepared to rely on the informal
testimony of a reputable jeweler as to the genuineness, quality and weight of the stone. For purposes of an
insurance claim, a more formal appraisal is almost always required, especially where the estimated value of
the stone is quite large. It is very tempting say that both the typical purchaser and the insurance company are
being reasonable. What is sufficient or adequate evidence in one context for one purpose is not sufficient or
adequate in another context for a different purpose.
(b) In the early days of opinion surveys (from the 30’s up till about 1948), Gallop and others did not base their
survey results on probability samples, but used quota sampling instead.49 Conclusions based on samples that
are not probability samples would be considered risky today (though they might still be entertained where
probability sampling is not feasible). Another example: a decision to approve widespread use of a
pharmaceutical not based on a double-blind evaluation of the pharmaceuticals effectiveness would be
considered unreasonable in most contexts today, though we would not fault those who drew conclusions based
on less stringent methods several generations ago.
What I am suggesting (but not proving) here is that the issue of what kind and quality of evidence is adequate
is context dependent, and therefore not exclusively a matter of logical form. It is possible, as well, that our
investigatory behavior with respect to a hypothesis such as "All emeralds are green" may be tied to contextual
factors and pragmatic constraints as well, and that it is only acknowledging the force of those constraints that
we can see why that behavior is reasonable.
Conclusion
15. I have tried to cast doubt on the thesis that argument validity is at bottom a matter of (logical) form. Though I
concede that the arguments I’ve offered in support of my counterexamples aren’t conclusive, I think they carry
enough weight to undermine any claim that the thesis in question should enjoy the status of a favored
hypothesis. That being so, I offer three observations about the consequences of holding that that thesis in
abeyance.
1) It is not a consequence of what I argue for that formal-logical techniques and evaluations have
no place in our critical practice. In the appraisal of arguments and inferences, it is often important
to know whether a given set of premisses entails a conclusion. This is especially important where
we want to assess the strength of support that premisses offer a conclusion. For a large class of
cases – those (a) which don’t fall into the category of semantic entailments and (b) where
"translation" into canonical notation is reasonably straightforward -- formal-logical techniques are
the preferred techniques for rendering a positive verdict of entailment.
2) If I am right, FDL does not constitute a normative theory of inference – or even the first
installment of a normative theory of inference. As far as I can see, we carry on our critical practice
in the absence of any normative theory of inference. But that doesn’t mean that critical practice
should eschew theory where theory is available and relevant to the issue at hand. FDL is a case in
point, so is the calculus of probability, economic theory, the theory of games, to name just a few
such theories.
3) In addition to the stretches of theory that can, in certain contexts, advance the aims of critical
practice, there are evaluative techniques and strategies, not grounded in theory, which can be
continued, cultivated and elaborated upon, and studied. I count among these non-theory-based
techniques the method of logical analogy and the deployment of the concept of fallacy and of the
fallacy labels. It may turn out after all that the core of our critical practice will continue to consist in
techniques not grounded in a theory. If so, that perhaps ought not to surprise us, since there is a
long tradition that views logic as an organon or art, rather than a science.
Notes
1The words are from Massey 1987, p. 163.
2Govier 1987, p. 178.
3Semantic validity holds where premisses "deductively entail" a conclusion and formal validity requires that
"the conclusion is formally derivable from its premisses using the rules of a correct logical system". See Govier
1987, p. 178.
4I have defended this conception in Pinto 1996.
5See Pinto 1996, pp. 175-176: "...20th century epistemology--and in particular, 20th century philosophy of
science--has made us aware that the goodness of many of our most fateful and highly prized inferences does
not yield to any simple analysis in terms of pattern or guiding principle. And yet the value of those inferences is
not something that is just arbitrarily accepted; rather it is something open to discussion and rational
evaluattion. We move, therefore, to a broadened conception of critcism, one not tied quite so closely to logical
rules or material principles of inference, but modelled in part on the discussions of the probative value of
evidence that occur in contexts where articulable rules are not available."
6I have argued elsewhere that "although argument assessment can profitably be thought of as having two
distinct focuses--acceptability of premisses and suitablity of inferential link--assessment of inferential link
cannot be carried on in isolation from assessment of premiss acceptability." See Pinto 1994, p. 120.
7Not everybody looks kindly on this usage. Hamblyn, for example, frowns on it. See Hamblyn 1970, p. 252.
8John Woods, "The Necessity of Formalism in Formal Logic," p. 150-151. Woods' reasons for holding this
view are of a piece with the reasons Harmon has for holding. By the way, my claim that semantic entailments
do not depend on logical form, then FDL as we know it does not represent a general theory of entailment, but
provides a theory for only a proper subset of entailments.
9See Pinto 1996, p. 170. See also Pinto 1995, section 3, for further arguments to support the contention that
the "general notion of suitable inferential link--the notion that's required for argument appraisal--differs
importantly fromt he formal logical notion of entailment..." (Pinto 1995, p. 120).
10This definition of deductivism is taken from Leo Groarke's recent defense of deductivism; see Groarke
1999, p. 1.
11Groarke 1999, p. 2. For Groarke "an argument is deductively valid if (and only if) it is impossible for the
premisses to be true and the conclusion false" (ibid.). Groarke makes the same points in Groarke 1992, p.
premisses to be true and the conclusion false" (ibid.). Groarke makes the same points in Groarke 1992, p.
113.
12Govier 1985, p. 27. According to Finnocchiaro 1995, the "refutation by logical analogy" is called "the
method of counterexample" in Salmon 1984, p. 21. Copi and Cohen 1990 recognize "refutation by logical
analogy" in their chapter on "Analogy and Probable Inference" (see esp. pp. pp. 371-373), though they go on
to say that "[u]nderlying this method of criticizing arguments is the fact that from the point of view of logic, the
form of an argument is its most important aspect" (p. 371).
13I personally prefer to follow Brian Skyrms suggestion that we not try to divide arguments or inference into
"deductive arguments" and nondeductive arguments," but that we rather see ourselves as evaluating
arguments arguments as deductively valid, inductively strong and inductively weak. If we prefer to speak in this
way, we can reformulate Govier's point as follows: this technique can be applied to arguments which are not
deductively valid in order to settle the question of whether they are inductively strong.
14Govier, p. 29.
15Other than what he calls "the trivial logic-indifferent method" of showing that the argument's premisses are
all true and its conclusion false. See Massey 1981, p. 164.
16Finocchiaro 1995, p. 29. See also Finnochiaro 1996, p. 156.
17Finocchiaro 1995, p. 30. See also Finnochiaro 1996, p. 158.
18See "Philosophies of the Branches of Knowledge: Philosophy of Logic: LOGIC AS A DISCIPLINE: Nature
and Varieties of Logic" in Enclyclopedia Britannica, CR-Rom version,, 1998.
19This idea is anticipated by Russell in the early decades of this century. See for example Russell's
Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1919), pp. 199ff.
20Quine 1961, pp. 22-23.
21A1 can provide good reason for believing A2 only if our reasons for believing A1 to be true don't depend on
our knowing antecedently that A2 is true.
22The obvious way to do this, of course, is to add a conditional proposition whose antecedent is the
conjunction of the pre-existing premisses and whose consequent is the conclusion of the argument.
23Nor do I think there can be. What is at stake here are issues that turn on which way of reconstructing or
construing arguments best serves the interests of criticism. There will be advantages and disadvantages to
either (or any) technique of interpretation or reconstruction, and one's position on this matter will depend on the
relative weights one gives to the pros to the cons.
24This can be proved as follows, where R is the rule that whatever is strictly implied by a necessary truth is a
necessary truth:
1) p & q --> r                                                                                                    premiss
2) Necessarily p                                                                                              premiss
3) Necessarily if (p & q then r)                                                                       from (1) by definition of '-->'
4) Necessarily if p then (if q then r))                                                              from (3) by exportation
5)p --> (if q then r)                                                                                           from (4) by the definition of '-->'
6) Necessarily if q then r                                                                                from (2) and (5) by R
7) q --> r                                                                                                           from (6) by the definition of '-->'
'-->'
QED
QED
25Carnap 1967, p. 225.
26See Hitchcock 1985, 1987 and 1995. Strictly speaking, it is not until the 1995 paper that semantic
entailments are drawn into the story. The exposition that follows is based on the 1995 paper.
27Hitchcock says (p. 60) that in addition to the notion of validity here defined, it is necessary to recognize a
notion of validity that applies to arguments that are not conclusively valid. The main business of the 1995 paper
is to work out a notion of non-conclusive validity for the class of arguments that Wellman called conductive
arguments.
28Hitchcock 1995, p. 59.
29Hitchcock 1995, p. 59. The universal generalization is to be "interpreted as a lawlike generalization,
capable of being rebutted by counterfactual truths."
30Hitchcock 1995, p. 59.
31Since the schema are generated by substituting variable letters for the variable components. See Hitchcock
1995, p. 59.
32Admittedly, Hitchcock, recognizing that there is identifying variable components, introduces an alternate
definition of conclusive validity that does not invoke the notion of variable component (see bottom of page 58).
However, that only shows that the "substitutional" version of conclusive validity does not require the concept of
variable component. It does not show that the formal or schematic conception can get off the ground without
the notion of a variable component.
33Goodman (p. 74) calls (1) and (2) incompatible, but strictly speaking that's not so. (1) and (2) could both be
true, but only if no emeralds will be found after time t.
34Goodman applies the terms 'projectible' and 'not projectible' to hypotheses. In much of the ensuing literature,
those terms are commonly applied to the predicates or properties that are constituent to the hypotheses under
discussion. Thus it is common to ask why 'green' is projectible but 'grue' not.
35A point admitted, in just these terms, in the exposition of the problem on p. 79. Goodman's solution to the
problem, in Chapter III, depends on classifying certain predicates as "entrenched" and considering hypotheses
projectible only if the predicates that they contain are entrenched. It also matters that 'emerald' is "well-
behaved" - see Goodman's examples of ill-behaved terms such as 'emerose' occurring in the antecedent of a
generalization - e.g. in footnote 10 p. 74.
36In the terminology of those writing on the problem after Goodman; see footnote 34 above.
37See Goodman 1965, pp. 75-77.
38This differs, of course, from Goodman's definition of 'grue'. I use this definition to simplify the reasoning
below. In this slightly altered conception, the predicate grue creates virtually all the same problems as did
Goodman's original predicate.
39A is statistically independent of B (within a class K) if the relative frequency of A within K is equal to the
relative frequency of A with the intersection of K and things that are B.
40We believe that among emeralds - perhaps among precious stones generally - whether something has the
"color" grue is affected by discovery date, but whether it has the color gree is not affected by the discovery
date.
41A necessary condition of coherence is logicial consistency with other things we believe. But additional
41A necessary condition of coherence is logicial consistency with other things we believe. But additional
factors affecting the degrees of coherence will include the extent to which the hypothesis is explained by other
things we believe and the extent to which it explains other things we believe.
42This is, in my view, the ultimate moral to be drawn from Goodman's puzzle. Note that despite superficial
similarity, it is different from Goodman's "solution" to the riddle. Goodman's solution in Chapter III makes the
projectibility of hypotheses dependent on the "entrenchment" of predicates, and leads him to say, "Thus the
line between valid and invalid predictions (or inductions or projections) is drawn upon the basis of how the
world is and has been described and anticipated in words" (Goodman 1965, p. 119). In Goodman, the body of
fact which creates the line between valid and invalid projections is a body of facts about our linguistic
practices. In the moral I want to draw, it is our background beliefs about extra-linguistic fact to which we must
revert in distinguishing between invalid and valid projections.
43Where the relevant requirement of representativeness is captured by something like R1.
44If S is a species of kind K, then everything that is S is also K. But not every person who is presumptively
innocent is innocent, and not every inference that is presumptively valid is valid.
45In her definition of umbrella validity, Govier presumably has in mind adequate reasons for accepting or
believing the proposition that is the conclusion of an argument or inference. I have argued elsewhere that the
notion of argument should be generalized to include attempts to induce doxastic attitudes weaker than belief
or acceptance - e.g., to the presentation of evidence with the intent of getting someone to suspect that
something is so (see Pinto 1991). Accommodating this view would require a somewhat more complicated
presentation of the point I am making here.
46Walton 1995.
47Valid with true premisses.
48A cogent argument is on that provides good reasons for accepting its conclusion. Even though an argument
should in fact be sound (because it has true premisses and is valid), it will fail to be cognent if we have no
reason to believe one or more of its premisses.
49In probability sampling, the researcher uses a method in which each member of the population is supposed
to have an equal chance of being selected (drawing names from a hat, using a table of random numbers in
connection with a list of population members, etc.). Simple random sampling is the most obvious way of
generating a probability sample, but somewhat more complex methods (stratified random sampling and
cluster sampling) make it easier to generate probability samples for very large populations. Gallop and others
today attempt to obtain probability samples, but the samples generated are not true probability samples (the
homeless have no chance of being selected, not every body who is selected is actually interviewed, etc.). In
quota sampling, one uses non-randomized methods for generating a sample that is representative of the
population with respect to key variables: gender, geography, economic class, urban vs. rural.
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